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Commentaries and Replies
On “The Army’s Identity Crisis”
Conrad C. Crane

This commentary responds to Gates Brown’s article “The Army’s Identity Crisis”
published in the Winter 2016–17 issue of Parameters (vol. 46, no. 4).

A

lthough it recognizes the difficulty of predicting the location
and timing of the next war, the Army has tried to prepare for
certain types. Historically, the choices have been between the
most dangerous, generally a full-blown conventional war against a nearpeer, or the most likely, a lower scale conflict such as counterinsurgency.
Some have argued all other types of war or contingencies are just
subsets of the first category, a misconception that has had significant
consequences from Baghdad to Bosnia, and from Haiti to Helmand. Dr.
Gates Brown has introduced a new twist, arguing that in the current
environment, the most dangerous scenario of full-scale combined arms
warfare against a near-peer competitor is also the most likely, and the
Army should train and structure itself accordingly.
He supports that claim by stating that Army Doctrine Publication
3-0, Unified Land Operations, defines the Army’s main threats as a
nonstate actor with weapons of mass destruction that would best be
handled by special operations forces, or a nuclear capable nation-state
partnered with nonstate actors. In fact, the doctrine just calls those “the
most challenging potential enemy,” a variation on the most dangerous
argument, and states, “The most likely security threats that Army forces
will encounter are best described as hybrid threats” (4). The passage goes
on to explain that such enemies might resort to high-end capabilities
of conventional state confl ict or protracted war with irregular proxies,
and the Army must be prepared to deal with all aspects of such a threat
spectrum, including protecting populations.
Without doctrinal justification, the most effective argument Brown
has left to make is that instead of risking an incoherent approach while
trying to develop a force capable of both counterinsurgency and maneuver
warfare against a near-peer, the Army would be better off focusing its
mission, acquisitions, and training on what he terms the “most direct
threat to the nation,” which is a high-intensity confl ict, and accepting
increased risk for other levels of confl ict or operations. That is a return
to the traditional debate. His position ignores the implications of hybrid
threats, and the fact that both Chinese and Russian doctrine writings
emphasize the utility of what have been called gray-zone confl icts that
avoid the level of high intensity or full blown conventional war.
His approach makes some sense for systems acquisition, as highintensity confl ict is the most technologically dependent. Training is
another matter. The Army did see degradation of some conventional
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combat skills over the last decade, most notably in large-scale fire and
maneuver, but has been working diligently to restore them. I have
heard the noted defense analyst Stephen Biddle advocate for an “Army
of Mediocrity.” That is not a very attractive bumper sticker, but his
point is the force can be given some preparation for a wide variety of
missions and then trained-up for specific deployments. That seems a
very sensible approach in an uncertain world where the Army cannot
choose the missions political leaders will assign.
Arguing in Congress for just the capabilities to conduct a highintensity conventional war risks making the Army a marginal
consideration for policymakers who want, and need, a much wider array
of options. Brown is correct that the size of the force will not allow
large-scale specialization and that future confl icts might not allow much
training time. But, there is no guarantee that such requirements will
always be for high-tech conventional war. I am confident that a force no
longer committed to the war in Iraq can maintain high enough readiness
to respond to any contingency short of the “big one.” If the worst
happens, the nation will need time to mobilize more forces anyway, and
limitations in strategic lift will always cause deployment delays from
CONUS bases. It is also incorrect to define any sort of confl ict as more
complex or difficult than another. One of my regrets about my work
with Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in 2006 was putting in the
quote that counterinsurgency was the “graduate level of war.” All war is
at the graduate level, it is just the final exams that are different.
In his article, Brown highlights the superb melding of missions,
training, and acquisitions that produced the AirLand Battle army that
performed so well in Operation Desert Storm. But, they never did
fight the chosen enemy and were lucky instead to go up against a poor
and battered Soviet clone. One of the reasons Future Combat Systems
failed—along with other programs of the 1990s like Force XXI Battle
Command Brigade and Below and the Army After Next—is they
continued to follow the same high-tech, high-intensity developmental
trajectory instead of realizing the world and its threats were changing,
with dire consequences in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Author Replies
Gates Brown
Dr. Crane rightly calls attention to the problematic nature of
forecasting future confl icts. No one knows the probability of a major
war occurring. But that reality does not mean it is impossible to discern
an emphasis for crafting our national defense or that we should assume
risks where there is a possibility of rapid catastrophic defeat.
In my article, I outlined the most dangerous threat to the nation, a
confl ict with near-peer competitors such as Russia or China who have
interests that in some ways counter those of the United States. Identifying
these states as the most likely near-peer competitors, however, is not the
same as calling them the most likely threats. The current threat, our
adversaries’ combination of conventional and unconventional forces
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into a hybrid approach to warfare, effectively mitigates the advantages
of the United States in terms of policy as well as force structure.
To understand this trend, it is important to put it into a broader
context. Hybrid tactics are a reaction to US dominance in conventional
maneuver warfare. Due to the need to maintain a low profi le, hybrid
confl icts have had a protracted nature; limited involvement, in turn,
gives rise to smaller political objectives. Neither of these characteristics
affects the threat. Thus, the critical fact Crane overlooks is that by
maintaining our capability in high-intensity maneuver warfare, US
adversaries are forced to operate in the gray zone.
Likewise, if the United States focused on a lighter force to combat
hybrid wars, our opponents would soon shift to tactics that mitigate that
approach. Focusing US force structure on maneuver warfare, therefore,
provides the capability to counter hybrid wars while preserving high-end
conventional maneuver forces necessary for bolstering and supporting
allied forces as well as countering hybrid aggression.
Hybrid wars, generally, require geographic proximity to the aggressor
state, Russia borders Ukraine, North Vietnam bordered South Vietnam.
A force fielded to fight maneuver warfare would be able to aid allied nations
to contain hybrid confl icts while maintaining the deterrence to major
combat operations. While it is true the forces fielded to support AirLand
Battle never fought the intended enemy, their capability forced potential
adversaries to wage limited wars for limited aims. The consequences of
Iraq and Afghanistan were a product of flawed strategy. The Army has
to assume risk and the best place to do that is with limited confl icts.
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On “Drawdown: The American Way of
Postwar”
John A. Bonin
This commentary responds to Brian McAllister Linn’s book review on Drawdown: The
American Way of Postwar published in the Winter 2016–17 issue of Parameters
(vol. 46, no. 4).

A

s an author of two chapters in the book, and a co-organizer of
the US Army War College conference that generated this volume,
I am uniquely positioned to respond to Brian Linn’s recent
review of Drawdown. This is especially true since his critique about the
lack of policy guidance and implications in the text seemingly overlooked
the stated purpose of the book—to contribute to the dialogue on
American military “drawdowns.” That dialogue “lacks a proper historical
perspective.” An historical baseline for drawing down forces and force
structures is essential to making informed decisions of the kind Linn seeks.
Over the course of my nearly 50 years of government service, I
have repeatedly encountered the lack of historical perspective in
critical decisions, particularly during the periods between confl icts.
Our authors provide some unique insights into America’s history of
drawdowns. Organized chronologically, the chapters establish both
context and relevance over some 500 years that can inform specific policy
prescriptions. This edited volume is no less coherent in its themes than
any edited military history volume of similar scope. Establishing a tight
relationship between early American history and those issues surrounding
the all-volunteer force of the current day is useless and ahistorical.
Beginning in the colonial era, sure patterns developed in American
history, which makes the text’s early focus relevant and necessary to the
overall thrust of the volume. These patterns include the underfunding of
military structure for short-term savings at the expense of longer-term
efficiencies. They emerged as a result of the “Liberty Dilemma”—the
uneasy relationship between the fear and the expense of standing armies
and the desire for safety that still affects drawdowns today. It goes beyond
the single aspect of “demobilization” that Linn highlights as applying only
to a portion of drawdowns, particularly of those involving mass armies.
Finally, Linn criticizes Drawdown for being too focused on battle and
operations; yet, considering aspects of drawdowns in a vacuum without
the reality of the influence of these on future successes or failures in war is
irrelevant. Understanding the trends mentioned above will better position
contemporary decision-makers to grapple with current challenges.

The Author Replies
Brian McAllister Linn
The author declined the opportunity to respond.

